Anne Conway’s Critique of Cartesian Dualism :: Dualism Essays

Anne Conways Critique of Cartesian DualismABSTRACT I describe and analyze Anne Conways critique of Cartesian dualism. After a abbreviated biographic introduction to Conway, I sketch some of the influences on her philosophy. I indeed describe her non-Cartesian view of middle. According to Conway, there is only one substance in created reality. This substance contains both matter and spirit. A purely material or spiritual substance is, she argues, an impossibility. Next, I discuss several of Conways arguments against Cartesian dualism. Firstly, dualism is inconsistent beca make use of dualists, while denying that concepts such as divisibility and extension are applicable to spiritual substance, nevertheless use such terms when describing the soul or spirit. They engage that soul or spirit is something particular which can be located somewhere. Secondly, she argues that dualism results in mechanism because it makes too sharp a distinction between body and soul, thus regarding the b ody as a mechanical machine and the soul as something which is not integrally related to the body. Thirdly, dualism cannot account for the interaction between forefront and body. The two substances of which a dualist speaks are defined on the basis of the exclusion of characteristics. But the two things which have nothing in common cannot influence separately other causally. 1. IntroductionDuring his lifetime and in the centuries following, the dualism and mechanism of Descartes philosophy gave rise to a great number of objections and discussions. In this article, I would like to consider a response to Descartes views which is somewhat less well-known than others, that of Anne Conway. Conways reaction to Descartes is interesting because she speaks from out of a metaphysical tradition contrasting from those of many other philosophers who discussed his ideas. (1) In addition, she makes use of a pre-modern, non-abstract idea of spirit, a conceptualisation of spirit which has been lo st or sidelined in the philosophical tradition after Descartes. On the basis of an entirely different ontology of matter and spirit from that of Descartes, Conway questions the presuppositions of dualism as well as its abstract view of spiritual substance. In this paper, I will begin with a short biographical sketch of Conway and a survey of some of the main influences on her thought. I will then briefly describe her philosophical system. I will then discuss her critique of Descartes dualism. Finally, I will consider the question of how her views can be of value to us today.